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Public Video Surveillance: 
A Puzzling Issue for Serbian 
Lawmakers
Milan Žarković, Zvonimir Ivanović, Ivan Žarković
Purpose: 
This paper examines the status of and practical problems in the use of public 
video surveillance for police and criminal procedural purposes.
Design/Methods/Approach: 
The approach in this research paper entailed a comparative legal analysis 
of the Serbian system with regard to public video surveillance and the use of 
recorded material as evidence in different procedures. Our research also examined 
reactions to the use of such material by various government agencies, such as 
the Ombudsman, the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and 
Personal Data Protection, as well as the procedures and activities of the police 
department when dealing with criminal investigations. This paper examines 
this issue from the perspective of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and their 
implementation in Serbia.
Findings: 
The results provide different perspectives on changes made in Serbian law. 
They also guided us in the interpretation of strategically important decisions and 
led us to construe methods and procedures for implementing different solutions 
and approaches in surveillance. 
Research Implications: 
Although the findings of this paper are strictly connected with the Serbian 
legal system, their implications and proposed solutions are universal in their 
possible application.
Originality/Value:
While in Serbia there have already been studies covering public video 
surveillance, evolutionary changes in certain crucial laws have lagged behind. 
This paper critically deals with such strategic imperfections.
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Javni video nadzor: zapleteno vprašanje za srbske 
zakonodajalce
Namen prispevka: 
Prispevek obravnava stanje in praktične težave pri uporabi javnega 
videonadzora za policijske in kazensko procesne namene.
Metode: 
Temeljni pristop v prispevku je izvedba primerjalno-pravne analize srbskega 
sistema javnega video nadzora in uporabe posnetega materiala kot dokaza v 
različnih postopkih. V raziskavi smo preučili tudi reakcije glede uporabe posnetega 
materiala s strani različnih državnih organov, kot sta varuh človekovih pravic in 
komisar za informiranje javnega pomena in varstvo osebnih podatkov. Prikazani 
so tudi postopki in dejavnosti policije, ki se ukvarja s preiskavo kaznivega dejanja. 
Problematika je obravnavana tudi z vidika Evropske konvencije o človekovih 
pravicah (EKČP), sodne prakse Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice in 
njihovo izvajanje v Srbiji.
Ugotovitve: 
Rezultati predstavljajo različne perspektive uvajanja sprememb v srbsko 
zakonodajo. Vodijo tudi k razlagi strateško pomembnih odločitev in predstavljajo 
različne rešitve in pristope za izvajanje nadzora.
Praktična uporabnost: 
Vsebina prispevka je tesno povezana s srbskim pravnim sistemom. Obenem 
pa so ugotovitve in predlagane rešitve splošne in uporabne tudi v drugih državah.
Izvirnost/pomembnost prispevka: 
Čeprav so v Srbiji že bile študije, ki zajemajo javni videonadzor, pa so 
razvojne spremembe v nekaterih ključnih zakonih zaostajale. Prispevek te 
strateške pomanjkljivosti kritično obravnava.
UDK: 343
Ključne besede: nadzor, javni nadzor, javni video nadzor, Srbija, zakonodaja
1 INTRODUCTION
Even though technology is rapidly and continuously evolving, there are still 
more technical innovations that could improve everyday life. When it comes to 
protecting residential, commercial and public buildings, premises and places, 
video surveillance systems can play an important role in preventing adverse 
events, along with their use by (repressive) regulatory authorities. In Serbia, 
many public buildings (both commercial and residential) have installed video 
surveillance systems in recent years and this has become one of the main means 
for protection and crime prevention. 
On one hand, if a video surveillance system is properly designed it may 
prove useful in preventing improper behaviour at sports stadiums or other public 
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events, as well as during traffic control and supervision. Preventive or proactive 
actions are possible if a police officer spots someone committing or attempting 
to commit a crime (e.g. theft or robbery) and responds in an appropriate way by 
way of prevention or detection. A suppressive effect on crime can be achieved by 
archiving and analysing adverse events. This may be of great importance for the 
further course of operational work and could later provide evidence in criminal 
proceedings. On the other hand, setting up the equipment for video surveillance 
without clear, strict and normative legal regulation may lead to the violation of 
basic human rights, particularly those to privacy. 
Therefore, we deal with the normative regulation of public video surveillance 
systems in the Republic of Serbia and neighbouring countries, as well as the risks 
and perspectives that exist when it comes to the right to privacy.
2 NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING VIDEO 
SURVEILLANCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
The primary goal of public video surveillance systems is to increase potential 
offenders’ awareness of the risk of being caught in order to deter them from 
possible perpetration. Having that in mind, the prerequisite conditions for using 
video surveillance in the Republic of Serbia, as well as the laws and bylaws 
governed by international legal documents which are primarily concentrated on 
human rights (especially the right to privacy and more specifically Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR], 1950) and the corresponding 
obligations of competent state authorities. 
Among the many legal documents at the European level, the most significant 
ones are: 
• Article 8 of the ECHR (1950), which states that everyone has the right to 
respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence.
• The European Convention on the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Council of Europe, 1981) of 
the Council of Europe mainly regulates the processing of personal data. 
Questions concerning technical protection are regulated in Chapter 2 
of the Convention, which among other things determines which data 
cannot be processed (i.e. data related to religious and racial origins, 
political opinions, health status, or sexual orientation) and other data 
protection measures. 
• Pursuant to the Data Protection Directive of the European Parliament 
(European Commission, 1995), member states primarily agreed to 
protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, in particular 
their right to privacy with regard to the processing of personal data.
• Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights in the European 
Union (European Commission, 2000) emphasises that everyone has the 
right to protection of their personal data. The second paragraph of Article 
8 stresses that such data can be processed for a specific purpose but must 
have the consent of the person in question or some other legitimate 
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reason for processing the data, based on law. This paragraph also states 
that everyone has the right to access information gathered about him or 
her, as well as the right to rebut such data.
The European Charter for a Democratic Use of Video Surveillance (European 
Forum for Urban Security, 2010) was created as a result of a project of the European 
Forum for Urban Security which identified seven key principles to be adhered to 
when using video surveillance. These principles are as follows: 
1. The principle of legality
The design and implementation of video surveillance can only be done and paid 
for pursuant to existing laws and regulations. 
2. The principle of necessity
The installation of video surveillance systems must be justified. 
3. The principle of proportionality
The design and deployment of a video surveillance system must be 
appropriate and proportionate to the vulnerability of the protected premises or 
persons. Proportionality is chiefly related to the objectives to be achieved and the 
means for achieving them. 
4. Principle of transparency 
Each legal entity must have a clear and consistent policy concerning the operation 
of its system. 
5. The principle of responsibility 
The right to supervise public places is reserved for carefully selected properties. 
Proprietors are responsible for the systems installed on their behalf. 
6. Principle of independent control 
 The term “control” means a clearly established system of norms and standards. 
Control can be performed by an independent expert or a special body, including 
citizen participation. 
7. The principle of citizen participation
Everything must be done to encourage citizen involvement in every stage of the 
development of video surveillance systems. 
In addition to the above EU legal documents, when it comes to video 
surveillance, the legislative framework in the Republic of Serbia contains the 
following laws:
Article 69 of the Law on Police (2005, 2011) regulates recording in public 
places. This regulation specifies that recording in public places comprises the 
continuous acoustic and video surveillance of public places in which criminal 
offences are frequently committed in order to suppress them. If there is the risk 
of a threat to human health and life or property during a public gathering, an 
authorised official may permit video recording or photographing of a public 
event. The police are obliged to publicly disclose their intention to carry out these 
activities.
In order to achieve efficient protection of the state border, Article 61 of the 
Law on State Border Protection (2008) stipulates that border police have the right 
to collect personal data and to add this to the records of individuals over whom 
that right is exercised. For the purpose of keeping records, border police are 
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authorised to perform scanning and video surveillance. Devices must be placed 
in a prominent place and marked with a warning sign. Recordings of personal 
data collected in this way must be destroyed 5 years from the day they were made, 
unless they are required for the purpose of criminal proceedings.
On 13 December 2012, the Regulation on Installing and Using Equipment and 
other Technical Resources while Protecting the State Border (2012) was adopted 
to regulate the installation and use of such equipment and other technical means 
in accordance with the above protective objective. Among other things, the 
Regulation provides that border police may use automatic devices for imaging 
and recording video material during surveillance as well as other technical means 
to record or photograph events at border crossings. In the event of recording at a 
border crossing, passengers and other persons should be alerted with a warning 
sign about the installation of automatic devices for taking pictures, recording and 
video surveillance. In addition, this regulation provides that automatic devices can 
be used for the prevention and identification of illegal crossings of the state border 
and other illegal activities. In accordance with international law and regulations, 
the regulations and  images made in this way may be copied or electronically 
processed for training purposes, as proof in criminal or disciplinary proceedings, 
in determining facts in appeal proceedings, or in determining material loss. The 
primary purpose is for training, but first the images must be electronically altered 
so that it is not possible to determine the identity of the person/s in them. 
Article 23 of the Law on City Police (2009) stipulates that, while performing 
activities within their jurisdiction, municipal police have the power to provide 
video surveillance wherever needed to prevent violations in public spaces and 
other facilities. The space or facility must be marked clearly with a distinguishable 
inscription that there is video surveillance. The video monitoring devices used 
must be visible. 
In the new Law on Road Traffic Safety (2009, 2010, 2011), video surveillance 
may be employed for the prevention of traffic violations and as evidence. Article 
296 stipulates that if a police officer and competent inspection authority in control 
of traffic establish through video surveillance or photo records that a vehicle is 
parked or has stopped in a manner which violates the Act, they may order the 
removal of vehicles in a period which may be shorter than three minutes. Article 
322 states that a photo or video record in which the vehicle’s registration number 
and relevant elements of the offence are clearly visible represents an authentic 
document proving the perpetration of the offence. 
The Law on the Protection of Personal Data (2008, 2009, 2012) prescribes 
conditions for the gathering and processing of personal data, together with the 
rights and protection of those rights of people whose data are collected and 
processed. It also regulates restrictions on personal data protection, the procedure 
before the competent authority for the protection of personal data, security 
data, records, data exports from the Republic of Serbia, and supervision of the 
application of this Act.
Article 15 of the Law on the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour 
at Sports Events (2003, 2007, 2009, 2013) states that the organiser is obliged to 
provide technical equipment to monitor and record the entry and behaviour of 
people in the sports facility. 
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Article 54 of the Law on Games of Chance (2011, 2012) stipulates that, by order 
of the Board, the organiser has to ensure continuous audio-video surveillance of 
tables and gaming devices, casino entrances and exits, players and visitors, as well 
as provide documentation of continuous recordings made over a 10-day period.
The National Strategy for the Fight against Corruption in Serbia for the 
period 2013 to 2018 (2013) lists video surveillance at border posts and border 
crossing points as an effective means for fighting corruption, as well as helping 
determine responsibility. This Strategy cites the lack of a legal framework, 
technical equipment, and incompetent staff as the greatest problems.
When it comes to privacy protection, on the basis of the aforementioned it 
can be concluded that in the Republic of Serbia legislative provisions have not 
been adopted that in a comprehensive manner could resolve the issue of video 
surveillance in the context of the processing and protection of personal data. 
Although the conditions for collecting and processing personal data, the personal 
rights and the protection of those persons whose data is collected and processed, 
and the limits to the protection of personal data, as well as the procedure before 
the competent authority for the protection of personal data, securing of data, 
keeping records, and transfer of data from the Republic of Serbia abroad are all 
defined by the Law on the Protection of Personal Data (2008, 2009, 2012), the Law 
contains no provision to regulate the processing of personal data of citizens using 
video surveillance. 
According to proposed amendments to the above-mentioned law1, video 
surveillance is defined as any system used to capture particular public, official 
and working space acting, regardless of whether it allows control or storage of 
videos thereby made and their transfer via a computer network.
The proposal also contains specific provisions regarding video surveillance 
with access to official and business premises and video surveillance installed 
on official and business premises. Article 34 of the draft law states that the data 
controller can establish access control in official or business premises if needed for 
the safety of persons and property, in order to control entry or exit from official 
or business premises, or if due to the nature of work there are potential risks 
for employees. The decision on introducing video surveillance must be made 
in writing by the data controller. This decision must contain the reasons for the 
introduction of video surveillance if the introduction of video surveillance is 
not already prescribed by law, and the employees who work in a space under 
video surveillance must be informed about it. Video surveillance is not allowed 
in official and business premises outside the workplace, particularly in changing 
rooms, lifts and sanitary facilities. Particular objectives and outcomes of video 
surveillance are determined by the specifics of objects where video surveillance 
is to be implemented (e.g. in banks and exchange offices to use video surveillance 
to deter a potential perpetrator from making attacks on the protected object and, 
in the event a robbery did occur, video surveillance footage may be important 
evidence in the process of detecting, clarifying and proving it).
1	 Commisioner	 for	 Information	of	Public	 Importance	and	Personal	Data	protection	has	prepared	model	of	
Law	on	personal	data	protection	and	opened	public	dispute	on	it	in	June	of	2014	Model	of	the	law	is	opened	
publicly	 and	 posted	 at:	 http://www.poverenik.rs/images/stories/model-zakona/modelzzpl.docx	 (last	 time	
accessed	on	04.08.2015).
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The different bodies of legislation in countries in the region have dealt with 
the use of public video surveillance in a largely similar way, so we will briefly 
review their laws and regulations in which  video surveillance is regulated 
differently than in Serbia.
For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina the issue of video surveillance is 
regulated by Article 21a of the Bosnian Law on the Protection of Personal Data 
(2006, 2011) governing the issue of personal data processing by video surveillance. 
This Article stipulates that recordings obtained through video surveillance from 
a certain area on the basis of which a data carrier can be identified – represent a 
collection of personal data, and the controller who performs video surveillance 
is obliged to make a decision that will contain the processing rules with the aim 
of respecting the right of the data carrier’s privacy and personal life. It is the 
obligation of the controller which does the surveillance in a publicly accessible 
place to prominently display a notice on monitoring and contact through which 
information about the video surveillance can be obtained.
In the Republic of Croatia, the field of video surveillance is regulated by the 
Ordinance on the manner and conditions for performing private security in public 
areas.
This Ordinance regulates the methods and conditions for implementing 
private security in public areas, as well as the method for exercising powers on 
public land under the Croatian Law on Private Security (2003, 2010) by authorised 
persons. When it comes to technical security, the Ordinance defines the basic 
characteristics of the video surveillance system (the minimum to be met by 
technical equipment and the treatment of recorded material). Authorisation to 
provide private security in public areas is issued by the police department that 
supervises the performance of security activities that are dedicated to certain 
security authorities on the proposal of the local government.
Video surveillance in Montenegro is regulated by the Montenegrin Law on 
Protection of Personal Data (2008, 2009, 2012).
The mentioned Act stipulates that a public authority, the Local Government 
Administration, a company or other private entity or entrepreneur can perform 
video surveillance and thereby access official or commercial property for the safety 
of persons and property, to control entry or exit in official or business premises 
or if due to the nature of work there is a possible risk to employees’ safety. In 
addition to defining the conditions for setting up video surveillance in residential 
buildings, official or business premises, the said Act defines the rules concerning 
the content of video (e.g. the recording must include the date and time) as well as 
the handling of personal data. The provisions of the said Act apply to the use of 
video surveillance in public areas, unless a special law provides otherwise.
Based on the above, and in the context of protecting the right to privacy, 
it can be concluded that video surveillance entails obtaining and storing audio, 
visual or other records through a system of video cameras, and that state agencies 
and economic entities planning to install video surveillance in order to record 
and store images and videos of recorded areas must meet and adhere to certain 
rules. This primarily involves a clear idea of  whether the setting of the system is 
in accordance with the law; whether it is necessary and possible to achieve certain 
objectives by use of another solution.
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When it comes to privacy protection, given the above-mentioned it can be 
concluded that in the Republic of Serbia legislative provisions have not been 
adopted in a comprehensive manner concerning the issue of video surveillance 
in the context of the processing and protection of personal data. Although the 
conditions for collecting and processing of personal data, the rights of persons 
and the protection of the rights of persons whose data is collected and processed, 
are limited to the protection of personal data, the procedure before the competent 
authority for the protection of personal data, securing of data, making records, 
and transferring data from the Republic of Serbia are regulated by the Law on 
the Protection of Personal Data (2008, 2009, 2012), the Law contains no provision 
regulating the processing of personal data of citizens using video surveillance.
The proposed amendments in the text provide a better environment since 
video surveillance is defined as any system used to capture a particular public, 
official and working space, regardless of whether it allows only monitoring or 
recording and storing of video thereby captured and transmitting that data via a 
computer network.
The proposal also contains specific provisions regarding video surveillance 
with access to official and business premises and video surveillance on official 
and business premises. Article 34 of the proposal states that the data controller 
can perform access control on official or business premises if necessary for the 
safety of persons and property, to control entry or exit from official or business 
premises, or if due to the nature of work there are potential risks for employees. 
The decision on video surveillance must be made in writing. It must contain 
the reasons for introducing the video surveillance, if the introduction of video 
surveillance is not prescribed by law, and the employees who work in a space 
under video surveillance must be informed about it. Video surveillance is not 
allowed on official and business premises outside the workplace, particularly in 
changing rooms, lifts and sanitary facilities. Particular objectives and outcomes of 
video surveillance applications are determined by the specifics of buildings where 
video surveillance is implemented (e.g. in banks and exchange offices to use video 
surveillance in order to deter a potential perpetrator from making attacks on the 
protected object and, in case a robbery does occur, video surveillance footage may 
be important evidence). 
3 THE USE OF PUBLIC VIDEO SURVEILLANCE IN SERBIA
In late 2010, projects were initiated in cities across Serbia to introduce video 
surveillance in order to deter potential perpetrators. There are currently more 
than 150,000 cameras located in public places on the streets of Belgrade and Novi 
Sad. Video surveillance systems are also deployed and established in Subotica, 
Pancevo, Prokuplje and other major cities. Over the last few years, video 
surveillance has been massively introduced in many buildings, such as schools, 
restaurants, bars, business and residential areas, as well as other public places. In 
addition, it should be mentioned that the introduction of video surveillance in 
schools supports preventive measures taken by the police already in progress to 
improve the safety of children. For example, in May 2011 in a police station in 
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Novi Beograd a control room was opened where a duty officer continually (24/7) 
monitors all primary schools in the municipality through 36 cameras, and 
responds if necessary. In addition, it should be noted that this type of monitoring 
has been included in some schools in the Belgrade municipalities of Palilula, 
Vračar, Rakovica, Zemun and, from mid-October 2011, to all schools in the 
municipality of Stari Grad. When it comes to preventive actions for traffic safety, 
the project “A modern model of traffic control” was launched in early 2008. This 
project involves the introduction of so-called “interceptors” (vehicles without 
police markings) in the daily work of the traffic police to improve traffic control. 
These “interceptors” are cars with high-level technical ability, fitted with special 
equipment to detect and document offences and crimes. This equipment allows 
video documentation of any violation being committed, whether the vehicle in 
question is in motion or at rest (Figure 1 and Figure 2). This new prevention 
method was introduced to raise drivers’ objective and subjective awareness of 
increased levels of detection risk, as well as possible sanctions for unlawful 
behaviour in traffic (Moje dete, 2011).
In the first half of 2014, the Ombudsman for information of public interest 
and the protection of personal data ordered the Ministry of the Interior of the 
Republic of Serbia to stop the unauthorised processing of personal data by 
police officers and citizens controlling cameras installed in patrol cars, as well 
as audio-recording devices installed in equipment and uniforms. This primarily 
relates to vehicles equipped with video surveillance that are used for recording 
the interventions of police officers on the move, movement behind the controlled 
vehicle at a distance of three to five metres, while the audio-video surveillance 
Figure 1
Figure 2
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is used to record the intervention of police officers stationed at a traffic control 
at the same distance. It is important to note that the prohibition does not apply 
to the use of “interceptors”, which is defined by law and provides evidence that 
an offence has been committed. It was further pointed out that recordings made 
by an unspecified number of police officers and citizens in traffic had no lawful 
authority, legally stipulated purpose or proper court order (MUP upozoren da 
ispuni nalog poverenika, 2014).
4 ECHR PRACTICE IN MATTERS OF SURVEILLANCE
The focus of Article 8 of the ECHR, 1950 is the protection of an individual 
from arbitrary interference by public authorities. One such interference is 
public surveillance, whose results can be used in various ways. However, this 
provision does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference; in 
addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there are positive obligations 
inherent in effective consideration of private or family life, even at public sites. 
These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure 
consideration for private life, even in the sphere of individuals’ relations between 
themselves (the case of Söderman v. Sweden, 20132, Airey v. Ireland, 19793), and 
especially in public locations such as squares, streets and so on.
The choice of means determined to secure compliance with Article 8 of the 
ECHR (1950; the Convention) in terms of the relations of individuals among 
themselves is in principle a matter falling within States’ margins of appreciation, 
whether the State’s obligations are positive or negative. There are different ways 
of ensuring respect for private life and the nature of the State’s obligation will 
depend on the particular aspect of private life at issue (see, for example, Von 
Hannover v. Germany, 20124; Odièvre v. France, 20035; Evans v. the United 
Kingdom, 20076; and Mosley v. the United Kingdom, 20117). Where a particularly 
important feature of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, or where the 
activities in question involve a most intimate aspect of private life, the margin 
allowed for the State is correspondingly narrowed (Söderman v. Sweden, 20138).
In terms of protecting the physical and psychological integrity of an 
individual from other persons, the Court has previously held that the authorities’ 
positive obligations (in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR, 1950 and 
in other instances under Article 8 alone or combined with Article 3 of the ECHR, 
1950) may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal 
framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (a 
2	 Söderman	v.	Sweden	(Application	no.	5786/08),	ECHR	100	(2013)
3	 Airey	v.	Ireland,	9	October	1979,	§	32,	Series	A	no.	32
4 Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos.40660/08 and 60641/08, § 104, ECHR 2012
5	 Odièvre	v.	France	[GC],	no.	42326/98,	§	46,	ECHR	2003	III
6	 Evans	v.	the	United	Kingdom	[GC],	no.	6339/05,	§	77,	ECHR	2007	I
7	 Mosley	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	no.	48009/08,	§	109,	10	May	2011
8 Söderman	v.	Sweden	(Application	no.	5786/08),	ECHR	100	(2013)
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comparison could be made with Osman v. the United Kingdom, 19989; Bevacqua 
and S. v. Bulgaria, 200810; Sandra Janković v. Croatia, 200911; A v. Croatia, 201012; 
and Đorđević v. Croatia, 201213).
Regarding children who are particularly vulnerable, the measures applied by 
the State to protect them against acts of violence fall within the scope of Articles 3 
and 8, and they should be effective. They include reasonable steps to prevent any 
ill treatment of which the authorities had, or ought to have had, knowledge and to 
create an effective deterrence against such serious breaches of personal integrity 
(Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, 200114; M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, 
201115). Such measures must aim to ensure respect for human dignity and protect 
the best interests of the child (compare with C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, 201216; 
Pretty v. the United Kingdom, 200217).
Regarding serious acts, such as rape and sexual abuse of children 
where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at stake, it 
falls upon the member states to ensure that efficient criminal law provisions 
are in place (for example, X and Y v. the Netherlands, 198518; M.C. v. Bulgaria, 
200319). This obligation also stems from other international instruments such 
as, inter alia, Articles 19 and 34 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (United Nations, 1989) and Chapter VI, “Substantive criminal law”, 
of the Council of Europe Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2007).
Concerning such serious acts, the State’s positive obligation under Articles 
3 and 8 to safeguard the individual’s physical integrity may also extend to 
questions relating to the effectiveness of the criminal investigation (There are 
many authorities, but among others, similar ones are C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, 
201220; M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, 201121; and M.C. v. Bulgaria, 200322) and to 
the possibility of obtaining reparation and redress (see, mutatis	mutandis, C.A.S. 
and C.S. v. Romania, 201223), although there is no absolute right to successful 
prosecution or conviction of any particular person where there was no culpable 
9	 Osman	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	28	October	1998,	§§	128-30,	Reports	of	Judgments	and	Decisions	1998	
VIII,	§§	128-30
10	 Bevacqua	and	S.	v.	Bulgaria,	no.	71127/01,	§	65,	12	June	2008
11	 Sandra	Janković	v.	Croatia,	no.	38478/05,	§	45,	5	March	2009
12	 A	v.	Croatia,	no.	55164/08,	§	60,	14	October	2010
13	 Đorđević	v.	Croatia,	no.	41526/10,	§§141-43,	ECHR	2012
14	 Z	and	Others	v.	the	United	Kingdom	[GC],	no.	29392/95,	§	73,	ECHR	2001
15	 M.P.	and	Others	v.	Bulgaria,	no.	22457/08,	§	108,	15	November	2011
16	 C.A.S.	and	C.S.	v.	Romania,	no.	26692/05,	§	82,	20	March	2012
17	 Pretty	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	no.	2346/02,	§	65,	ECHR	2002	III
18	 X	and	Y	v.	the	Netherlands,	26	March	1985,	§	27,	Series	A	no.	91
19	 M.C.	v.	Bulgaria	Application	no.	39272/98	4	December	2003
20	 C.A.S.	and	C.S.	v.	Romania,	no.	26692/05,	§	82,	20	March	2012
21	 M.P.	and	Others	v.	Bulgaria,	no.	22457/08,	§	108,	15	November	2011
22	 M.C.	v.	Bulgaria	Application	no.	39272/98	4	December	2003
23	 C.A.S.	and	C.S.	v.	Romania,	no.	26692/05,	§	82,	20	March	2012
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failure to seek to hold perpetrators of criminal offences accountable (compare, for 
example, Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, 200724; Szula v. the United Kingdom 
200725).
As to acts that do not constitute the seriousness of those at issue in X and Y 
v. the Netherlands, 198526 and M.C. v Bulgaria, 200327, the Court has examined 
the State’s obligation to protect, for example, a minor against malicious 
misrepresentation under Article 8 (see K.U. v. Finland, 200828). The wrongful act in 
that case did not involve any physical violence but could not be considered trivial 
as it entailed a potential threat to the minor’s physical and mental welfare brought 
about by an difficult situation, namely that he was made the target of approaches 
by paedophiles. The act constituted a criminal offence under domestic law and the 
Court considered that practical and effective protection of the applicant required 
the availability of a remedy enabling the actual offender to be identified and 
brought to justice. The state failed to provide a legal instrument to enforce the 
right of the child. 
More generally, however, in respect of less serious acts between individuals, 
which may violate psychological integrity, the State’s obligation to maintain and 
apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection under Article 
8 does not always require that an efficient criminal-law provision covering the 
specific act be in place. The legal framework could also consist of civil-law remedies 
capable of affording sufficient protection (compare, mutatis	mutandis, X and Y v. 
the Netherlands, 198529; K.U. v. Finland, 200830). The Court noted, for example, 
that in certain previous cases concerning the protection of a person’s picture 
from abuse by others, the remedies available among member states have been 
of a civil-law nature, possibly combined with procedural remedies, such as the 
granting of an injunction (for comparison, inter alia, Von Hannover v. Germany, 
201231; Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece, 200932; and Schüssel v. Austria, 200233). 
Hence, it is also very important to stress that guaranteeing the Convention’s right 
to protection of one’s image does require the criminalisation of covert filming 
and photographing of children and adults. Further, for public surveillance there 
should be many more safeguards in place for any individual. Signs or other types 
of public notices should be clearly displayed to draw the attention of members of 
the public, and warn them before they enter an area under surveillance. In that 
way, state instruments of Orwell’s 1984 Big Brother-like public surveillance and 
prerogatives are legally covered, but with safeguards protecting individuals from 
24 Brecknell	v.	the	United	Kingdom,	no.	32457/04,	27	November	2007
25 Szula	v.	the	United	Kingdom (dec.),	no.	18727/06,	4	January	2007
26	 X	and	Y	v.	the	Netherlands,	26	March	1985,	§	27,	Series	A	no.	91
27	 M.C.	v.	Bulgaria	Application	no.	39272/98	4	December	2003
28	 K.U.	v.	Finland,	no.	2872/02,	§§	45-49,	ECHR	2008-V
29	 X	and	Y	v.	the	Netherlands,	26	March	1985,	§	27,	Series	A	no.	91
30	 K.U.	v.	Finland,	no.	2872/02,	§§	45-49,	ECHR	2008-V
31	 Von	Hannover	v.	Germany	(no.	2)	[GC],	nos.40660/08	and	60641/08,	§	104,	ECHR	2012
32	 Reklos	and	Davourlis	v.	Greece,	no.	1234/05,	15	January	2009
33	 Schüssel	v.	Austria	(dec.),	no.	42409/98,	21	February	2002
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the misuse and abuse of such power. Those safeguards should not only cover 
information about present surveillance but also about their operation, recordings, 
storage and further use. Safeguards should even cover quality standards for 
technical specifications of appliances and technical or electronic safeguards for 
the use of any device. In the course of elaborating such standards in relation to 
public surveillance, it is worthwhile considering the case of Szypusz v. the United 
Kingdom, 201034. In that case, the court accepted evidence from public surveillance 
cameras (CCTV) within a prison (or detainment facility) near to the actual crime 
scene. The only safeguard the court emphasised was that the operator of the 
CCTV equipment in the field should not present the CCTV evidence in court as 
that might also be considered to be a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR: the right 
to a fair trial. Safeguards should also be considered in light of the case Andrzej 
Krupicz v. Poland, 201635, in which the applicant claimed a breach of Article 3 of 
the ECHR on the grounds he was subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment 
through CCTV cameras installed in communal showers. Note that it was not a 
breach of Article 8 of the ECHR that was claimed here, but of Article 3. This should 
also be considered when elaborating this area.   
In the case of Söderman v. Sweden, 201336 the Court examined whether, in 
the particular circumstances of the facts before it, Sweden had an adequate legal 
framework to provide the applicant with protection against the specific actions 
of her stepfather and would, to this end, assess whether each of the remedies 
allegedly available to her.
This new approach brings us to another issue we should consider. Even if all 
safeguards have been implemented in our internal legislation, the ECHR could 
find that not all safeguards have been considered, and through that we could 
receive a judgement referring to some legislative deficiency. 
This approach, it should be emphasised, differs from that followed by the 
Chamber, which affirmed that “only significant flaws in legislation and practice, 
and their application, would amount to a breach of the State’s positive obligations 
under Article 8”. This referred to the terms used in M.C. v. Bulgaria, 200337 (§167) in 
relation to the scope of the State’s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the 
Convention to afford protection against rape and sexual abuse. However, in that 
judgement the Court applied the “significant flaw” test to “alleged shortcomings 
in the investigation”, pointing out that it “was not concerned with allegations of 
errors or isolated omissions” (§ 168) and holding that the shortcomings were 
“significant” (§§ 179 and 184) (also see M. and C. v. Romania, 201138; compare 
and contrast Siliadin v. France, 200539 where such wording was used relative to a 
review of legislation and practice under Article 4 of the Convention).
It was stressed there that “The Grand Chamber considers that such a 
significant flaw test, while understandable in the context of investigations, has 
34 Szypusz	v.	the	United	Kingdom	-	8400/07,	21.9.2010
35	 Andrzej	Krupicz	v.	Poland,	Application	no.	6068/12	1.	March,	2016
36 Söderman	v.	Sweden	(Application	no.	5786/08),	ECHR	100	(2013)
37	 M.C.	v.	Bulgaria	Application	no.	39272/98	4	December	2003
38	 M.	and	C.	v.	Romania,	no.	29032/04,	§§	112	et	seq.,	27	September	2011
39	 Siliadin	v.	France,	no.	73316/01,	§	130,	ECHR	2005	VII
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no meaningful role in an assessment as to whether the respondent State had in 
place an adequate	legal	framework in compliance with its positive obligations under 
Article 8 of the ECHR, 1950 since the issue before the Court concerns the question 
of whether the law afforded an acceptable level of protection to the applicant in 
the circumstances” (§ 91, Söderman v. Sweden, 201340).
Especially in such cases it is crucial to have a very integrated, interconnected 
legislative system. For instance, in this work, practically all major issues and 
powers relating to public surveillance are covered and, even if the problem 
involved a criminal prosecution of a perpetrator by the public prosecutor, it could 
be covered by a private criminal indictment.
It is interesting to note the way in which the Supreme Court of Sweden in its 
judgement of 23 October 2008 dealt with this issue: “The need for a strengthened 
legal framework against covert filming had already been acknowledged in Swedish 
legislative work in the 1960s, but had not yet led to any concrete results. The 
Supreme Court found it highly questionable whether the fact that acts of filming 
of an individual in situations where such filming deeply violated the personal 
integrity of the person concerned was left wholly unpunished under Swedish 
law was compatible with the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention” (§ 105, 
Söderman v. Sweden, 201341). We can infer from this citation that even internal 
courts could initiate legislative changes in relation to the ECHR especially in this 
case in relation to Article 8. 
In this case, the court found that neither a criminal nor a civil remedy existed 
under Swedish law that could enable the applicant to obtain effective protection 
against the said violation of her personal integrity in the specific circumstances 
of the case. Accordingly, there was a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. So, from 
this, we can infer that it is possible to have a violation of the ECHR even if a right 
is systematically covered legislatively because rights should be covered from the 
general aspect of the ECHR – in particular relating to Articles 3 and 8.
5 CONCLUSION
A video surveillance system is an effective preventive measure. Its effect on crime 
prevention is accomplished indirectly by strengthening informal social control 
and cohesion of the community in which the monitoring is carried out. 
It should be noted that, despite the increasingly frequent use of video 
surveillance in the Republic of Serbia, there is still no law clearly defining the 
issue. Although it is not normatively regulated, the use of video surveillance in 
Serbia is growing (over 350,000 cameras installed). At an international level, one 
of the most important normative acts is definitely a charter on the democratic 
application of video surveillance in the European Union, which regulates all 
video surveillance issues from a human rights perspective. This memorandum 
has already been signed by a dozen cities in Europe. 
From the standpoint of prevention, video surveillance has undergone a boost 
in its application in preventive measures taken to increase the safety of children 
40 Söderman	v.	Sweden	(Application	no.	5786/08),	ECHR	100	(2013)
41 Söderman	v.	Sweden	(Application	no.	5786/08),	ECHR	100	(2013)
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in schools and in preventive measures regarding road safety. The system has also 
been applied for the security of protected areas of commercial premises such as 
banks, post offices, major shopping centres etc. in order to influence a potential 
offender’s consciousness, with the overall goal of deterring a perpetrator from 
committing a criminal act.
In addition to prevention, video surveillance systems can lead to a reduced 
fear of crime and provide very important information in police investigations. 
Based on studies around the world, it can be concluded that CCTV has the greatest 
application in monitoring relatively small areas such as public parking places and 
transport stations, and the smallest application in large spaces such as squares, 
parks, residential buildings etc.
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